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94 N.C. L. REV. 1068 (2016)

Biometric Data Collection and RFID Tracking in Schools: A
Reasoned Approach to Reasonable Expectations of Privacy*
That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and
teach youth to discount important principles of our government
as mere platitudes.1
INTRODUCTION
At a time when many have decried the seemingly glacial pace at
which this nation’s public schools have incorporated technology into
their pedagogical practices,2 twenty-first century advances are
revolutionizing other aspects of the educational experience. Among
these changes, the collection and use of biometric information—
uniquely identifiable physical characteristics ranging from
fingerprints, to palm prints, to iris or retina patterns3—have been
implemented in more than one thousand school districts in forty
states,4 with some of these schools also tracking students’ movements

* © 2016 Stefan P. Schropp.
1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
2. See, e.g., Darrell M. West & Joshua Bleiberg, Five Ways Teachers Can Use
Technology to Help Students, BROOKINGS (May 7, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research
/opinions/2013/05/07-teachers-technology-students-education-west-bleiberg [http://perma.cc
/3DBH-N8AX] (“Technology has failed to transform our schools . . . .”); Ryan Lytle, Teacher
Training Needed to Meet Technology Needs in Classrooms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Sept. 20, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/high-schools/articles
/2012/09/20/teacher-training-needed-to-meet-technology-needs-in-classrooms [http://perma
.cc/7CVM-BEZ4] (detailing a survey of “high school and college students, teachers, and
parents in the United States, China, and Germany” finding that “82 percent [of respondents]
across the globe also noted that technology needs to play a bigger role in classrooms”); Linda
Starr, Encouraging Teacher Technology Use, EDUC. WORLD, http://www.educationworld
.com/a_tech/tech159.shtml (last updated Mar. 31, 2012) [http://perma.cc/VNP8-6WPR]
(“Some teachers, experts say, still are reluctant to use technology, mostly because of a lack of
time, a lack of resources, or a lack of confidence in their ability to use the available
technology.”).
3. See infra Section I.A.
4. Jeffrey Stinson, As Florida Bans Use of Biometric IDs in Schools, Other States
Scale Back on Big Brother, FLAGLERLIVE.COM (Nov. 2, 2014), http://flaglerlive.com/72393
/children-biometrics/ [http://perma.cc/Y53H-4K7A] (“Jay Fry, CEO of the biometric-inschools firm identiMetrics, said biometric identification is used in more than 1,000 school
districts in 40 states from Alaska to Long Island, New York. West Virginia uses the
technology in 70 percent of its 57 school districts . . . .”). But see id. (“Several states are
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through microchips.5 The new technology promises increased
efficiency and improved student outcomes on a range of daily
activities in the life of a student with applications from the lunch line
to the library and the school bus to the classroom.6
But despite the technologies’ promise, these advances have not
come without their fair share of detractors. A nascent body of
scholarly work,7 a passionate and growing cluster of advocacy groups,8
and a patchwork of legislative proposals9 have critically reviewed the
security concerns and potential for malfeasance inherent in biometric
data collection and radio-frequency identification (“RFID”) tracking.
These critiques have ranged from the purely rhetorical10 to the
perfectly well reasoned11 and have come from both ends of the
traditional political spectrum.12
now banning or restricting the use of the technology in schools, as worries over student
privacy have risen amid breaches of government and commercial computer databases.”).
5. See infra Section I.A.
6. See infra Section III.C.
7. See, e.g., Nicole A. Ozer, Rights “Chipped” Away: RFID and Identification
Documents, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶¶ 26–43 (2008) (section entitled “Insecure
RFID Technology Interferes with Constitutional Rights”); Alexandra C. Hirsch,
Comment, Schools: Where Fewer Rights Are Reasonable? Why the Reasonableness
Standard Is Inappropriate to Measure the Use of RFID Tracking Devices on Students, 28 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 411–14 (2011).
8. See, e.g., AGAINST RFID IN SCHOOLS, http://rfidinschools.com (last updated Mar.
17, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8CC7-MUU6]; Paul Joseph Watson, Texas Students Revolt
Against Mandatory RFID Tracking Chips, INFOWARS (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://www.infowars.com/texas-students-revolt-against-mandatory-rfid-tracking-chips/
[http://perma.cc/J2KK-HVD4].
9. See infra Section IV.A.
10. Take, for example, the comments of Missouri State Senator Ed Emery who
sponsored the legislation prohibiting the use of RFID tracking in schools and believes
“[t]here’s a ‘Big Brother’ quality to this.” Jeffrey Stinson, States Backtrack on Student
Tracking Technology, STATELINE (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/Researchand-Analysis/Blogs/Stateline/2014/10/27/States-Backtrack-on-Student-TrackingTechnology [http://perma.cc/98ZA-VVHT].
11. See, e.g., id. (“[L]awmakers [should] focus on transparency so parents know how
the technology is being used, what data is collected and what safeguards are in place to
protect students’ privacy.”).
12. Opposition to this technology has come from Republicans like Missouri State
Senator Ed Emery and Florida State Senator Dorothy Hukill, who both sponsored
legislation limiting or prohibiting its use. See id; Act of May 12, 2014, ch. 2014-41, § 2, 2014
Fla. Laws 798, 799 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 1002.222 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Spec.
A Sess.)); Act of Sept. 10, 2014, 2014 Mo. Legis. Serv. 137, 137 (West) (codified at MO.
REV. STAT. § 167.168 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Mo. Gen. Assemb. 2d Reg. Sess.)). It
has also come from Democrats like former Rhode Island State Senator John Tassoni, who
sponsored the legislation in his state to ban the use of RFID tracking in schools. See S.B.
211, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2009); Claire Swedberg, Rhode Island Governor
Vetoes Restrictions on RFID, RFID J. (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles
/view?5377 [http://perma.cc/7D7K-WDZ7].
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Given the developing nature of literature in this field to date, it is
important to note at the outset exactly where this Recent
Development fits—what it is and, more importantly, what it is not. It
is not an Orwellian “parade of horribles,” imagining a world where
“every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every
movement scrutinized.”13 Nor is it an attempt to account for the more
well-founded fears that, in a world where even the wealthiest
multinational corporations are subject to data breaches,14 perhaps
even well-intentioned (but admittedly underfunded) school districts
are not the appropriate repositories for sensitive personal
information. Each of these approaches grapples with the compelling
concerns that are raised when this technology is not used as it was
intended—when something goes wrong.
This Recent Development seeks to address the different but
equally important concern that is raised when this technology works
exactly as it was intended—when it goes according to plan. In its
intended and most benign form, this technology necessarily requires
trade-offs between students’ privacy and school efficiency and
security that threaten wolf-like encroachments on the Fourth
Amendment cloaked in the sheep’s clothing of twenty-first century
advancement. Accordingly, this Recent Development seeks to test
the constitutional support for the widespread collection of public
school students’ unique biometric information. Moreover, it provides
a framework for state legislatures to evaluate these trade-offs and
decide for themselves—and for their students—whether the gains are
worth the cost. This Recent Development freely admits, as did the
Supreme Court over a century ago, that such compromises “may
be . . . the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form”15

13. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 5 (1949).
14. See, e.g., Rachel Abrams, Target Puts Data Breach Costs at $148 Million, and
Forecasts Profit Drop, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06
/business/target-puts-data-breach-costs-at-148-million.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/JTM5L9AK (dark archive)]; Jordan Robertson, Which Big Retailer Hasn’t Reported a Major
Breach—Yet?, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 21, 2014, 7:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2014-10-21/which-big-retailer-hasn-t-reported-a-major-breach-yet[http://perma.cc/C64D-U8FW].
15. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). Indeed, the Court has often
rebuked the slow erosion of privacy rights. See generally id. (“It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis.”); Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“These examples and many
others demonstrate an alarming trend whereby the privacy and dignity of our citizens is
being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each step may
be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a society
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but ultimately concludes, as that Court acknowledged, that to do
nothing risks the greater harm of allowing “illegitimate and
unconstitutional practices [to] get their first footing in that way,
namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes
of procedure.”16
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of
the field of biometrics and RFID technology with emphasis on
school-specific applications of the technology. Part II examines the
Fourth Amendment issues raised by the proliferation of this
technology in schools and details the case law that provides a
foundation for analysis. Part III analyzes the competing interests
under consideration in this context using the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment framework and attempts to balance the needs of the
school with the interests of the student. Finally, Part IV details the
legislative responses to this point and suggests a comprehensive plan
to ameliorate the concerns while preserving the benefits of these
programs.
I. BIOMETRICS
Biometrics refers to the measurement of an individual’s unique
physical characteristics and the matching of those characteristics
against previously recorded information to determine a person’s
identity.17 Biometric data collection “is the process whereby biometric
measurements are collected and integrated into a computer system,
which can then be used to automatically recognize a person.”18
Biometric data collection and scanning can serve two different
purposes.19 The first, known as identification, compares biometric
information against all previously stored information and makes a
“one-compared-to-many match.”20 In the education context, this
function allows a computer to uniquely identify a student from a
database containing data on every student in a population. The
quite unlike any we have seen—a society in which government may intrude into the secret
regions of man’s life at will.”).
16. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
17. See Anil Jain, Lin Hong & Sharath Pankanti, Biometric Identification, 43 COMM.
ACM 91, 92 (2000); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Brave New Whorl, WASH. POST (Mar. 30,
1997), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1997/03/30/brave-new-whorl
/6e618930-9765-43a3-803c-94a589d266d0/ [https://perma.cc/D9CX-XPL9].
18. John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the
Concerns—Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 100 (1997).
19. See id.
20. See id.; see also Rudy Ng, Note, Catching Up to Our Biometric Future: Fourth
Amendment Privacy Rights and Biometric Identification Technology, 28 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 425, 428 (2006).
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second, known as verification, compares the biometric information
only to the stored information for the claimed identity and searches
for a “one-to-one” match.21 A verification system can only confirm
that students are who they claim to be but does not allow the system
to identify a particular student against all students in a population. In
addition to public schools, both private22 and other public-sector
entities23 have begun widespread use of biometric collections and
scanning.24
While the types of biometric information available to law and
immigration enforcement have expanded rapidly in recent years—and
may one day present an issue for public schools—the collection of
biometric information from students is more limited. Accordingly,
this Recent Development is limited to the three primary biometric
and tracking technologies currently available to schools: (1)
fingerprint or palm scans; (2) iris scans; and (3) the use of RFID
tracking. These methods of collection and their applications are
discussed below.
A. Fingerprint and Palm Scans
Law enforcement has used fingerprints for identification since
the early twentieth century, making fingerprints “the most common
and widely accepted form of biometric identification.”25 However, in
a recent push toward increased efficiency and security, schools across
the country have turned to fingerprint scanners in both their lunch

21. See Woodward, supra note 18, at 100; see also Ng, supra note 20, at 428.
22. Although not the focus of this Recent Development, private organizations—from
Disney theme parks to banks and credit card companies to private gyms—now use
customers’ biometric identification. See Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88
IND. L.J. 1475, 1532 (2013).
23. While this Recent Development focuses specifically on the use of biometrics in
public K–12 education, other examples of government use of biometrics include the
Secure Communities program (requiring biometric database screening of anyone
apprehended by state and local law enforcement), United States Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology (requiring fingerprint collection of all non-citizen visitors to
the United States), and U.S. Passports and e-Passports programs (requiring a digital photo
that is provided to a centralized facial recognition database). See id at 1531–33.
24. See, e.g., Woodward, supra note 18, at 97–98, 98 n.6.
25. Ng, supra note 20, at 429; see also John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious
Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65,
70 (2002) (“While fingerprinting is probably the most common and widely known form of
biometric identification, it is by no means the only example.”); Woodward, supra note 18,
at 104.
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lines26 and their libraries.27 Unlike traditional law enforcement
techniques, which compare the unique ridge formations of the entire
fingerprint,28 most school-based systems scan only a portion of a
student’s fingerprint.29 According to the companies producing and
promoting the technology, this reduces or eliminates the potential for
duplication and identity theft.30 Similarly, many school districts have
implemented palm scanners, which, rather than scanning the entire
palm, evaluate “the unique squiggle of lines made by the veins inside
the hand” and “convert[] the scanned veins to a numeric value that
matches each student in a database.”31 While these systems prevent
the duplication of fingerprint and palm scans and thereby reduce the
risk of identity theft, they must also be able to match biometric
information to an individual student using the one-to-many
identification approach of biometrics.
B.

Iris Scans

A second area of growth in biometric data collection of K–12
students is the expanded use of iris scans—particularly on school
buses.32 The iris is the colored portion of the eye, surrounding the
pupil, that contains a number of structures that can be used to
uniquely identify an individual.33 An image of the iris is captured
using a high-resolution camera and then compared to previously
recorded and stored images.34 Several companies35 have developed
26. See, e.g., School Cafeterias Trading Lunch Money for Fingerprint Scans, CBS CHI.
(July 2, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/07/02/school-cafeterias-tradinglunch-money-for-fingerprint-scans/ [http://perma.cc/4VYV-VT4W].
27. See, e.g., Best Practices—Technology: This Minnesota High School Gives Fingerprint
Scanning a Whorl, ESCHOOL NEWS (Sept. 1, 2000), http://www.eschoolnews.com/2000/09/01
/b-best-practices-b-technology-this-minnesota-high-school-gives-fingerprint-scanning-awhorl/ [http://perma.cc/SE33-JRP8].
28. See, e.g., Ng, supra note 20, at 429.
29. School Cafeterias Trading Lunch Money for Fingerprint Scans, supra note 26.
30. Id.; see also The identiMetrics Finger Scanning ID System, IDENTIMETRICS,
http://www.identimetrics.net/index.php/products/the-identimetric-finger-scanning-idsystem [https://perma.cc/E8MF-VTNY] (“Fingerprints cannot be recreated from the
encrypted numerical templates. Student accounts cannot be compromised.”).
31. James L. Rosica, Biometrics May Be Banned in Florida Schools, but Flourish
Elsewhere, TAMPA TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2014), http://tbo.com/news/politics/biometrics-may-bebanned-in-florida-schools-but-flourish-elsewhere-20140309/ [http://perma.cc/354L-S2WC].
32. See Laurie Segall & Erica Fink, Iris Scans Are the New School IDs, CNN MONEY
(July 11, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/11/technology/security/irisscanning-school/ [https://perma.cc/K73G-67BL].
33. Ng, supra note 20, at 431.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., BLINKSPOT, http://www.blinkspot.com [http://perma.cc/Z9MY-45Y8];
EYELOCK, http://eyelock.com/index.php/products/nano-nxt [http://perma.cc/GJ2M-ZYHP].
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iris scanners specifically for use on school buses.36 The technology
allows a student to look into a scanner (resembling a pair of
binoculars) and have his identity matched to those iris scans already
in the system.37 Once the system finds a match, it notifies the student
and the driver that the student is on the correct bus and allows
parents and school administrators to track the location of the
student.38 As with fingerprint and palm scans, advocates of the system
note that the data is encrypted and converted to a numeric code to
prevent identity theft.39 However, like all school-based biometric
information, iris scans use a one-to-many matching system that would
allow schools, which own the biometric data,40 to match an available
iris image to the existing database.
C.

Radio Frequency Identification

While it is not a biometric measurement in the traditional sense,
the advent and expanded use of RFID tracking shares the unique
identification and one-to-many matching capabilities of fingerprints
and iris scans. Since RFID technology originally appeared during
World War II, “significant improvements in functionality; decreases
in both size and costs, especially in the last decade; and agreements
on communication standards have combined to make the technology
[newly] viable” for a variety of purposes.41
RFID systems consist of three components: a microchip, a
reader, and a database.42 In a school-based RFID system, schools may
require students to carry the microchip (typically embedded in an ID
badge or sewn into a backpack) with them at all times.43 The chip can
communicate with readers in one of two ways.44 First, in a passive
system, the microchip communicates with the reader only when
36. Segall & Fink, supra note 32 (explaining how Blinkspot and Eyelock’s technology
can be used to track children when they board school buses).
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id. But see David Goldman, Hackers’ Next Target: Your Eyeballs, CNN MONEY
(July 26, 2012, 12:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/26/technology/iris-hacking/index
.htm?iid=EL [http://perma.cc/WMU8-CRB4] (noting that the susceptibility of fingerprint
and iris scans to reverse-engineering poses a huge problem).
40. See Segall & Fink, supra note 32 (noting that “the companies themselves don’t
collect any of the data—the schools . . . that use them own the data”).
41. DAVID C. WYLD, RFID: THE RIGHT FREQUENCY FOR GOVERNMENT 5 (2005),
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/RFIDReport.pdf [http://perma.cc
/ZE8F-AKNW].
42. Margaret L. Lorenc, Comment, The Mark of the Beast: U.S. Government Use of
RFID in Government-Issued Documents, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 583, 586 (2007).
43. See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 419.
44. Id. at 416.
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prompted—such as when placing a card with an embedded microchip
near a locked door or when passing by a reader placed in the
hallway.45 Conversely, in an active system, the microchip is in constant
communication with the reader and provides consistent and real-time
information on the location of the student.46 Finally, in both versions
a central database serves as a storage location for information that
allows authorized computers to access information stored in the
system.47 This information includes not only the location and
movements of the RFID chip but also any stored information unique
to the chip’s owner—including name, photo, and other biometric
indicators (such as fingerprint, palm print, or iris scan information).48
While both supporters and opponents of RFID use in schools
continue to debate the security these systems provide from identity
theft,49 the importance of these systems to this Recent Development
is that they serve both functions of a biometric scanner: the one-toone verification—confirming that a student was where she claims to
have been—and the one-to-many identification—determining which
student was in a particular location at a given time. Notwithstanding
the security and privacy concerns,50 several school districts—in states
from Texas51 to New Jersey52 to California53—have moved forward
45. Id. at 415–16.
46. Id.
47. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-551, INFORMATION
SECURITY: RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 1, 4, 9 (2005).
48. See id. at 9 (noting that the “type of information housed in the database will vary
by application” but can include “item identifier, description, manufacturer, movement of
the item, and location”).
49. Compare Hirsch, supra note 7, at 411–12 (suggesting that to steal RFID information
“all a determined delinquent must do is identify a target school experimenting with the new
safety system, pull a car up outside the building, and wait”), with Jennifer Radcliffe, Tracking
Devices in School Badges Raise Concerns, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 11, 2010, 5:30 AM),
http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/spring-news/article/Tracking-devices-in-school-badgesraise-concerns-1716571.php [http://perma.cc/Y6RN-QMFS] (“It’s a very secure system [with]
no data to confirm that there’s any . . . safety risks.”).
50. While the concern with data security and identity theft has been covered in this
Section, the remainder of the Recent Development focuses exclusively on the Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns raised by these systems.
51. See Radcliffe, supra note 49 (detailing the implementation of RFID tracking in
two Houston-area school districts).
52. See Claire Swedberg, New Jersey Schools Adopt RFID to Secure Their Facilities,
RFID J. (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?10971/ [http://perma.cc
/N2FJ-BNZB] (describing the implementation of RFID tracking systems in all of a New
Jersey district’s schools and in twenty-one of the district’s buses).
53. See Letter from Nicole A. Ozer, Tech. & Civil Liberties Policy Dir., ACLU of N.
Cal. & Lee Tien, Sr. Staff Att’y, Elec. Frontier Found., to Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. & Joe Valentine, Dir., Emp’t & Human
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with the implementation of RFID tracking programs in their schools.
While these security concerns deserve the continued discussion they
are receiving, the next Part instead focuses on the constitutional
issues raised by the implementation of these systems.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS IN THE SCHOOL CONTEXT
Children, like adults, enjoy the protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment—incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment—from unreasonable governmental searches
and seizures.54 However, unlike adults, those protections are modified
in the school setting to reflect the responsibility of the school to
safeguard and educate the nation’s youth.55 This Part looks briefly at
the historical context of the Fourth Amendment before detailing the
Supreme Court’s framework for analyzing its protections inside the
schoolhouse doors.
A. The Fourth Amendment Standard
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.”56 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he . . . historical
purpose of the Fourth Amendment . . . was to prevent the use of
governmental force to search a man’s house, his person, his papers,
and his effects.”57 Indeed, even among the sacred protections
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, those afforded by the Fourth
Amendment are arguably the most zealously guarded by the Court.58
Servs. Dep’t (Sept. 14, 2010), https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/asset_upload
_file994_9490.pdf [http://perma.cc/3L48-L6LS] (detailing attempts to implement RFID
tracking in California schools).
54. See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928).
58. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)) (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”); see also Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth
Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564 (1990) (noting that the
“fourth amendment protection [is] the single most important characteristic which
distinguishes a free society from a police state”). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102
MICH. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004) (“When technology is new or in flux, and its use may have
privacy implications far removed from property law, Fourth Amendment rules alone will
tend not to provide adequate privacy protections.”).
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Moreover, while the historical underpinnings of the Fourth
Amendment point to a desire to prevent the reappearance of “the
pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or ‘writs of
assistance’ to authorize searches for contraband by officers of the
Crown,” the Court has expanded its protections beyond those police
actions and has instead imposed its restrictions on all governmental
action.59
B.

The Fourth Amendment Goes to School

For the better part of the last century, the notion that the Fourth
Amendment, as incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment,60 “protects the rights of students against
encroachment by public school officials” has been, in the Supreme
Court’s estimation, “indisputable.”61 Indeed, at one point it seemed as
though the Court was willing to match the constitutional rights of
children within the schoolhouse to those of citizens outside it:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States,
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures—Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill
of Rights.62
However, since that time, the Supreme Court has slowly eroded
the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to students who cross
the schoolhouse threshold. Despite repeated assurances that students
do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,”63
the Court’s subsequent refinement has left students with Fourth
Amendment rights that “are different in public schools than
elsewhere” given that “the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard
the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”64 The

59. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (quoting Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)) (describing the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions as “upon the
activities of sovereign authority”).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
61. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334.
62. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943)).
63. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Although Tinker
considered First Amendment issues in the school context, the Court has adopted similar
language in the context of school searches and seizures as well. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S.
at 334 (“Equally indisputable is the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the rights of students against encroachment by public school officials . . . .”).
64. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995).
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Court has likewise found the probable cause standard of
reasonableness, as applied in the criminal context, to “be unsuited to
determining the reasonableness of administrative searches where the
[g]overnment seeks to prevent the development of hazardous
conditions”65 and “unnecessary in the public school context because
such requirements ‘would unduly interfere with the maintenance of
the swift and informal disciplinary procedures that are needed.’ ”66
Therefore, it seems clear that the side of the Fourth Amendment’s
balancing test weighted by the student’s legitimate expectation of
privacy “is limited in a public school environment where the State is
responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.”67
In the context of school searches, to determine the constitutional
reasonableness of a search the courts must “engage in a fact-specific
‘balancing’ inquiry, under which the magnitude of the government’s
need to conduct the search at issue is weighed against the nature of
the invasion that the search entails.”68 Under this test, “[o]n one side
of the balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of
privacy and personal security; on the other, the government’s need
for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.”69 To aid
in this fact-specific inquiry, the Supreme Court has developed a
framework that instructs a reviewing court to “consider first the
‘scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy at issue,’ then the
‘character of the intrusion that is complained of,’ and finally the
‘nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue’ and the
efficacy of the means employed for dealing with it.”70
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on Fourth
Amendment protections in schools—even applying the three-part
framework described above—does precious little to illuminate the
constitutional boundaries of biometric data collection and RFID
tracking. In the Court’s two leading cases, plaintiffs challenged the
random drug testing of student athletes and others participating in
extracurricular activities.71 In both of those cases, the Court relied

65. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 828 (2002) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668
(1989)).
66. Id. at 828–29 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 653).
67. Id. at 830.
68. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 352 (8th Cir. 2004)
(quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337).
69. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)).
70. Id. at 352 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–66 (1995)).
71. Earls, 536 U.S. at 822 (challenging a policy that “requires all middle and high
school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any
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heavily on the fact that the activities in question were voluntary to
find that the students had a reduced expectation of privacy72—a
conclusion that does little to help gauge a student’s privacy interest
where, as in the case of biometric tracking, the activity is
compulsory.73 Similarly, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,74 the Court
considered whether an administrator could reasonably search a
student’s bag upon suspicion that the student had been smoking
cigarettes in the bathroom75—an analysis which sheds little light on
systematic or ongoing searches and surveillance. A recent Supreme
Court decision holding that the strip-search of a thirteen-year-old girl
was too intrusive to be constitutionally permissible—even with
reasonable suspicion—similarly provides very little guidance upon
which to begin an analysis.76
However, a growing body of lower-court jurisprudence provides
the sketches of a boundary line to demarcate the legitimate interests
of the student and the needs of the school as they relate to ongoing
searches. For example, the Eighth Circuit recently held that random,
suspicionless searches of a student’s person and possessions ran far
afoul of constitutionally permitted activity.77 Despite noting that
students have a lower expectation of privacy inside the schoolhouse,
the court held that a “search of a child’s person . . . is undoubtedly a
severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.”78 While noting
the generalized concerns expressed by the school district regarding
the presence of weapons and drugs in its schools, the court poignantly
noted that “[a]ll schools surely have an interest in minimizing the
harm that the existence of weapons and controlled substances might
visit upon a student population, but public schools have never been
entitled to conduct random, full-scale searches . . . because of a mere

extracurricular activity”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995)
(challenging a program that “authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of students who
participate in . . . school athletics programs”).
72. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 823 (“In any event, students who participate in competitive
extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions on
their privacy as do athletes.”); Acton, 515 U.S. at 657 (“By choosing to ‘go out for the
team,’ they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that
imposed on students generally.”).
73. See infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
74. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
75. Id. at 347 (finding the “search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of
marihuana dealing” to be reasonable).
76. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009).
77. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 354 (8th Cir. 2004).
78. Id.
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apprehension.”79 Therefore, at least in the absence of particularized
suspicion, the court was willing to find that ongoing and systematic
searches were an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that random and
suspicionless use of drug-sniffing dogs (something at least one other
circuit has offered as an effective and minimally intrusive measure)80
violates the Fourth Amendment.81 Despite noting the important—
potentially even compelling—government interest at stake, the court
concluded that “[i]n the absence of a drug problem or crisis . . . the
government’s important interest in deterring student drug use would
not have been ‘placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion.’ ”82 Importantly, despite another court holding that the use
of dogs was minimally intrusive83—an argument that could be
advanced by proponents of RFID tracking, fingerprinting, and iris
scanning—the Ninth Circuit still required individualized suspicion
prior to the search.
C.

The Intersection of Biometric Data and the Fourth Amendment

Before balancing the students’ reasonable expectations of
privacy with the government’s interest in conducting the search, the
lingering question of whether the collection of biometric data and the
use of RFID tracking constitute searches must first be addressed.
While the Court has yet to consider the collection of biometric data
or the use of RFID tracking in schools, several recent cases shed light
on the struggle the Supreme Court is facing to match the “18thcentury guarantee against unreasonable searches”84 with twenty-first
century technology.
In one of the Court’s most recent85 technology-based Fourth
Amendment cases, United States v. Jones,86 the Court considered the
79. Id. at 356.
80. See id. at 355 (“Indeed, dogs and magnetometers are often employed in
conducting constitutionally reasonable large-scale ‘administrative’ searches precisely
because they are minimally intrusive, and provide an effective means for adducing the
requisite degree of individualized suspicion to conduct further, more intrusive searches.”).
81. B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1267–68 (9th Cir. 1999).
82. Id. at 1268 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997)).
83. See id.
84. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
85. The Court more recently considered the warrantless search of an individual’s cell
phone following a lawful arrest and unanimously concluded that, absent a warrant, such
action was unconstitutional. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). That case is
distinguishable from the situation under consideration here for a number of reasons—
most specifically that it was incident to a lawful arrest and did not represent a systematic
or ongoing search of the kind being considered here. See id.
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government’s use of Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking—a
technology identical in function, if not scope, to RFID tracking—and
held that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements,
constitutes a ‘search.’ ”87 Indeed, although the Jones Court split on the
test to be applied,88 Justice Sotomayor’s statement in concurrence
agreed with Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion that widespread and
warrantless tracking of citizens’ movements is a search and an affront
to a free society:
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects
of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that GPS
monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost such a
substantial quantum of intimate information about any person
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to
track—may “alter the relationship between citizen and
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”89
In a third opinion, Justice Alito, concurring with the three
remaining Justices of the Court’s liberal wing, noted that “[n]ew
technology may provide increased convenience or security at the
expense of privacy”90 but nonetheless concluded that the “lengthy
monitoring” constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.91
The Jones concurrences suggest that a majority of the Court would
hold that extended, warrantless monitoring of citizens by GPS—
particularly where that tracking also works a physical invasion92—
violates the Fourth Amendment. The long-term tracking at issue in
Jones parallels to the suspicionless tracking of students over an
extended period of time.
In the short period of time since Jones, lower courts have taken
note of the fact that five Justices would hold the long-term tracking of
86. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
87. Id. at 949.
88. Although the majority tethered its decision to the physical trespass worked by the
attachment of a tracking device to the defendant’s car, it also acknowledged that “[i]t may
be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without an accompanying
trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require
us to answer that question.” Id. at 954.
89. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640
F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
90. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 964.
92. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Government’s physical intrusion on
Jones’ Jeep supplies a narrower basis for decision.”).
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individuals to be unconstitutional under the reasonable-expectationof-privacy analysis.93 This suggests that, even if the mandated use of
RFID chips does not constitute a physical invasion (a doubtful
conclusion to be sure),94 the lower federal courts believe that a
majority of the Justices could hold that this data collection method
would violate the Fourth Amendment.
Conversely, existing case law on the involuntary collection of
biometric data in other contexts—including fingerprints, palm prints,
and iris scans—does little to discern the boundaries of appropriate
state actions in the public school context. The leading cases deal only
with the collection of biometric information by police from those
accused or suspected of crimes.95 Importantly, those cases have noted
that
fingerprinting
constitutes
a
search
“even
though
fingerprinting . . . represents a much less serious intrusion upon
personal security than other types of searches and detentions.”96
Perhaps the best that can be said in the way of guidance at this
point is that if the Supreme Court views palm prints and iris scans as
identical to fingerprints and if it would use the same standard inside a
school’s walls that it uses outside of them, then collecting fingerprints,
palm scans, and iris scans constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. That said, the Court’s jurisprudence strongly suggests
that fingerprinting does constitute a search in the criminal context
and there is no articulable reason why palm prints or iris scans would
be meaningfully different from fingerprints. Therefore, it seems
93. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 347 (4th Cir. 2015) (“In two
concurring opinions, five Justices confronted the Katz question and agreed that ‘longer
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy.’ ” (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring))), reh’g granted,
624 F. App’x 75 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Baez, 744 F.3d 30, 35–36 (1st Cir. 2014)
(“Jones also shed some new light on the Supreme Court’s understanding of a ‘dragnet,’
suggesting that the twenty-eight days of GPS monitoring at issue in that
case, . . . constituted a ‘dragnet’ . . . .”).
94. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that the RFID microchip must
be carried on a student’s person at all times).
95. See generally Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (holding fingerprint evidence
inadmissible when obtained during an unconstitutional investigative detention); Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (same). But see Trade Waste Mgmt. Ass’n v. Hughey, 780
F.2d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 1985) (considering government fingerprinting as part of a voluntary
licensing process).
96. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 814; cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968–69 (2013)
(holding that a buccal swab on a person’s inner cheek to collect DNA is a Fourth
Amendment search because “[v]irtually any ‘intrusio[n] into the human body[]’ . . . will
work an invasion of ‘cherished personal security that is subject to constitutional
scrutiny,’ ” and comparing the DNA swab to similar searches such as a breathalyzer test
and the scraping of an arrestee’s fingernails (quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295
(1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966))).
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likely—although far from certain—that a court would consider the
school actions under consideration in this Recent Development to
constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Whether that
search is reasonable is the subject of the next Part.
III. THE INTEREST AND THE NEED
Leaving aside the admittedly open question—at least in the
public school context—of whether biometric data collection and
RFID tracking constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes,
the question of whether it would be a reasonable one still remains.
Answering this question necessarily “depends on the context within
which a search takes place . . . [and] requires ‘balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails.’ ”97 This Part
details the Supreme Court’s three-part framework and considers: (1)
the “scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy at issue;” (2) the
“character of the intrusion that is complained of;” and (3) the “nature
and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue” considered in
light of the efficacy of the means employed by the school in dealing
with it.98
A. The Scope of the Student’s Expectation of Privacy
As threshold matters, “it would be ‘anomalous to say that the
individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth
Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior.’ ”99 Second, “[i]n carrying out searches and other
disciplinary
functions . . . [public]
school
officials
act
as
representatives of the State . . . and they cannot claim . . . immunity
from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”100 Finally, while
courts have been willing to curtail Fourth Amendment protections for
prisoners, “it goes almost without saying that ‘[t]he prisoner and the
schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the
harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration.’ ”101 Therefore, as
a baseline at least three things can be said about a student’s legitimate
expectation of privacy in the school building. Students can
legitimately expect Fourth Amendment protections: (1) that apply
97. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court,
387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)).
98. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 352 (8th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–66 (1995)).
99. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)).
100. Id. at 336–37.
101. Id. at 338 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977)).
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even if they are not suspected of a crime; (2) that apply even to
searches by school administrators; and (3) that are at least greater
than those afforded to prisoners.102
As the Supreme Court has noted, an expectation of privacy must
be one that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate, and not
simply an unreasonable or illegitimate subjective expectation of
privacy.103 Students, like adults, have a reasonable expectation that
they will not be required to provide fingerprints or iris scans, much
less have their movements tracked, as they go about their daily
activities.104 It is no stretch to imagine a citizen declining an invitation
to wear a GPS locator to transmit his location to the government or to
report to the police station for fingerprinting and iris scanning. And
yet, this is not only something we are asking our children to accept in
our schools but something we are training them to accept as normal
for the rest of their lives.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has already rejected as
“severely flawed” the notion that students have no legitimate
expectation of privacy given the high levels of supervision to which
they are already subjected.105 It is no argument—at least from the
Court’s perspective—to say that merely because an administrator can
physically watch a student, he should be permitted to do so
electronically; or that because a bus driver will recognize her riders,
she should be able to do so with an iris scan; or that because a student
already has a lunch number, the ones and zeroes of a palm scan are
no different. Indeed, the Jones Court rejected such an argument in
the context of GPS tracking, holding that even though traditional
surveillance of an individual would have been constitutional, GPS
tracking through a physical trespass exceeded permissible Fourth
Amendment bounds.106 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
suggested
that
where
“ ‘[t]raditional
surveillance’ . . . is
constitutionally permissible[,] . . . [i]t may be that achieving the same
result through electronic means . . . is an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy.”107
Finally, this privacy expectation is heightened even more when
the government mandates the activity. Although at least one court,

102. See supra note 99–101 and accompanying text.
103. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338.
104. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
105. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338.
106. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953–54 (2012).
107. Id. The Jones Court did not reach the question of whether the electronic
surveillance at issue would have been constitutional absent the physical trespass.
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outside the criminal context, has found that government-mandated
fingerprinting does not trigger Fourth Amendment protections,108 that
court tethered its decision to the determination that voluntary
fingerprinting “is required only as a condition for obtaining or
keeping a license to engage in a business that the state may license. It
is, moreover, rationally related to the investigation of the
qualifications of licensees.”109
When the state requires school children to provide fingerprints,
palm prints, or iris scans in order to attend school, the disclosure
becomes no less compulsory than where the police detain a suspect
for the purpose of fingerprinting and identification.110 And with such
compelled state action comes the attendant Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. Indeed, as early as 1918, all fifty states had enacted some
form of compulsory school attendance law111 and courts have
repeatedly noted the compulsory nature of school attendance.112
Additionally, the overwhelming majority of school districts are
federally required to provide school lunches113 and many states
require school districts to provide transportation to students who live
more than a certain distance from their school.114 At least one court
has noted that, where attendance is mandatory, constitutional
protections approaching those afforded in the criminal context are
warranted:
[B]ecause school attendance is compulsory, a student’s
participation . . . is not voluntary in the same way that
108. Trade Waste Mgmt. Ass’n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The
fingerprinting requirement in N.J.S.A. 13:1E–128b(2) is not involuntary in the fourth
amendment sense.”).
109. Id.
110. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,
723–24 (1969).
111. MICHAEL S. KATZ, A HISTORY OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION LAWS 17 (1976),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED119389.pdf [http://perma.cc/FGH3-CDLT].
112. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 354 (8th Cir.
2004) (“But the search regime at issue here is imposed upon the entire student body, so
the LRSD cannot reasonably claim that those subject to search have made a voluntary
tradeoff of some of their privacy interests in exchange for a benefit or privilege.”).
113. In 2013, more than ninety-four percent of the nation’s schools participated in the
National School Lunch Program. See Alexandra Sifferlin, Why Some Schools are Saying ‘No
Thanks’ to the School-Lunch Program, TIME (Aug. 29, 2013), http://healthland.time.com
/2013/08/29/why-some-schools-are-saying-no-thanks-to-the-school-lunch-program/
[http://perma.cc/8K3D-TGWM]. Schools participating in the National School Lunch
Program are required to “serve lunches that meet Federal requirements, and they must offer
free or reduced price lunches to eligible children.” National School Lunch Program, U.S.
DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/NSLPFactSheet.pdf [http://perma
.cc/3KH4-RVDE].
114. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:39-1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1068 (2016)

1086

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

participation in extracurricular activities is voluntary. [The
school district] “cannot reasonably claim that those subject to
search have made a voluntary tradeoff of some of their privacy
interests in exchange for a benefit or privilege.”115
As the court noted, it strains credulity to argue that, where the law
requires students to attend school, the state’s conditioning that
attendance on the submission of biometric information constitutes a
voluntary choice in any sense of the word. The important distinction
therefore becomes the voluntary or compulsory nature of the
disclosure.
B.

The Character of the School’s Intrusion

The second part of the Supreme Court’s framework requires a
reviewing court to consider the character of the intrusion by
biometric data collection. To be certain, the physical nature of the
intrusion on the student is so minimal as to border on the nonexistent.
That said, it is well accepted that “[v]irtually any ‘intrusion into the
human body,’ will work an invasion of cherished personal security
that is subject to constitutional scrutiny.”116 Thus while it is likely a
search,117 the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that fingerprinting
(and by extension palm printing) is among the least intrusive means
of searching available in the government’s arsenal.118 And in a world
where swabbing for DNA is considered to be unobtrusive,119 some
rightly worry that the limited physical trespass of an iris scan may
place it outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment.120 Likewise,

115. See Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1189–90 (D.N.M. 2011)
(quoting Doe, 380 F.3d at 354).
116. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (quoting Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)) (internal citations
omitted) (alterations omitted).
117. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985) (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 727 (1969)) (“[F]ingerprinting . . . represents a much less serious intrusion upon
personal security than other types of searches and detentions.”).
119. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985))
(“[The swab] involves but a light touch on the inside of the cheek; and although it can be
deemed a search within the body of the arrestee, it requires no ‘surgical intrusions beneath
the skin.’ The fact than an intrusion is negligible is of central relevance to determining
reasonableness, although it is still a search as the law defines that term.” (internal citations
omitted)).
120. See, e.g., Sabrina A. Lochner, Comment, Saving Face: Regulating Law
Enforcement’s Use of Mobile Facial Recognition Technology and Iris Scans, 55 ARIZ. L.
REV. 201, 217 (2013) (“Using its rationale in Jones, the Court could find that iris scans
violate the Fourth Amendment’s minimum protection and constitute searches; however,
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when schools mandate the use of a tracking device, they undoubtedly
“encroach[] on a protected area,”121 but the character of the physical
intrusion of the search is again so minimal as to approach the
inconsequential.
However, the Supreme Court has never limited its calculation of
the character of a government intrusion to simply the physical effects
felt by the citizens. Indeed Justice Sotomayor has aptly noted that
“[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms.”122 If the suggestion that the
erosion of privacy would work a tremendous and lasting change on
the psyche of American students is hyperbolic, then it is hyperbole in
good company—shared by Supreme Court Justices123 and legal
scholars alike.124 As one scholar has aptly described the intrusion
under consideration here:
There is a very good chance that an erosion of privacy and the
destruction of human values that go with privacy is a greater
long-range danger than the behavior that would be detected
and deterred by student searches. It would be highly desirable if
the citizens of the United States who are now in school learn to
value privacy, learn by the school’s example that the society
respects it, and learn that the courts will protect it from invasion
by governmental searches that violate fourth amendment
principles.125
It seems fair to say that however little the physical intrusion may be, it
is at least counterbalanced by the psychological intrusion these
programs would visit on students.
The final characteristic of this intrusion is the fact that it may
actually be larger than initially meets the eye. The possibility of
function creep—in which “databases created for one discrete purpose,
despite the initial promises of their creators, eventually take on new
functions and purposes”126—potentially expands the scope of this

the Court found the physical trespass in Jones important, and iris scans have no element of
physical trespassing.”).
121. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012).
122. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“This Court has recognized the vital relationship
between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.”).
123. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text.
125. William Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools,
59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 792 (1974).
126. Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69: A Dangerous
Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279, 283 (2005).
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intrusion well beyond the issues addressed to this point. Government
databases in the United States have a long history of function creep.127
Beginning with Social Security numbers—which were originally
conceived for the sole purpose of implementing the Social Security
system but soon became “the universal identifier that their creators
claimed they would not be”128—an expanding list of government
databases has succumbed to function creep.129 Indeed, “[e]ven
fingerprinting, the dominant method of criminal identification in the
twentieth century, was originally intended as a system of
recordkeeping for civil, not criminal, purposes.”130 Moreover, in light
of the USA PATRIOT Act’s131 permission for the government to use
the databases of private entities,132 it is difficult to imagine a school
official having the authority—let alone the will—to deny access to
federal or state officials133 who would use the databases for law
enforcement, immigration, or public health purposes.134

127. See id.; Rachel Cox, Comment, Unethical Intrusion: The Disproportionate Impact
of Law Enforcement DNA Sampling on Minority Populations, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 155,
169–70 (2015).
128. Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 126, at 283.
129. See, e.g., id. (detailing the expanded use of DNA databanks beyond their original
finite purpose); Linda Bartusiak, Comment, Plea Bargaining for DNA: Implications on the
Right to Privacy, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1115, 1128–29 (2011) (same).
130. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 40, Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753 (Md. 2014) (No.
14-885), 2015 WL 294800, at *40.
131. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 & 50 U.S.C.).
132. Id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2013));
Bartusiak, supra note 129, at 1129 (“In addition to the function creep occurring within
government-maintained DNA databases, the Patriot Act of 2001 permitted the
government greater access to datasets maintained by private entities.”).
133. As just one example, the Miller (or third-party) doctrine, “permits the
government to obtain information from third parties, in certain circumstances, without the
procedural hurdles that would otherwise present themselves if the information were
sought directly from a suspect.” Robert H. Gruber, Commercial Drones and Privacy: Can
We Trust States with “Drone Federalism”?, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 (2015); see also
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties.” (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1979))).
134. Recent research indicates that both iris scans and fingerprinting can reveal
sensitive personal medical information including whether the individual is suffering from
diabetes, arteriosclerosis, hypertension, AIDS, high blood pressure, Down syndrome, and
Turner syndrome. See Woodward, supra note 18, at 115–16.
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The Nature and Immediacy of the Concern and the Efficacy with
Which It Is Addressed

Certainly, much has changed since the Court first took “notice of
the difficulty of maintaining discipline in the public schools today”
while still concluding that “the situation is not so dire that students in
the schools may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy.”135
However, much remains the same as well. Indeed, the Court’s 1985
observation of the then-present state of the American schoolhouse
continues to aptly describe the contemporary classroom:
Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in
recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly
forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become
major social problems. Even in schools that . . . have been
spared the most severe disciplinary problems, the preservation
of order and a proper educational environment requires close
supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of
rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if
undertaken by an adult. “Events calling for discipline are
frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate,
effective action.”136
But even with that acknowledgement, courts have struck down school
practices: (1) where “generalized concerns about the existence of
weapons and drugs” led to subjecting “secondary public school
students to random, suspicionless searches of their persons and
belongings by school officials;”137 (2) where the school conducted
searches using drug sniffing dogs but the record did “not disclose that
there was any drug crisis or even a drug problem;”138 and (3) even
where pat-down searches would have effectively combated
demonstrated “concerns about drugs, alcohol, weapons, and
distracting contraband.”139
While there is no record to consider in the case of biometric
information and RFID tracking, school administrators who have
implemented these systems have given us something in the way of

135. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985).
136. Id. at 339–40 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)).
137. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 439, 451, 456 (8th Cir. 2004).
138. B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1268–69 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding
the practice unreasonable but ultimately dismissing the plaintiff’s claims on the basis of
qualified immunity).
139. Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1194, 1200 (D.N.M. 2011)
(granting a request for a temporary restraining order on the grounds that a suspicionless
search was likely unreasonable).
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identifying the government’s interest. Proponents of palm scans in
lunch lines in Florida have noted that the government interest is
“moving lunch lines faster and giving students more time to eat.”140
Those pushing iris-scanning technology on buses correctly point out
that it will allow parents to track their students in real time.141 When it
comes to RFID, school officials celebrate that “if a fight or injury has
occurred, or if a parent is concerned that a child might not be in
class . . . the software can be used to indicate where that individual
was and when [and] may also eliminate the need for teachers to take
attendance at the beginning of each class.”142 Additionally, almost
every accounting of the need for RFID tracking makes reference to
the desire to prevent tragedies involving school shootings.143
But with the exception of preventing school shootings,144 these
proffered governmental needs barely scratch the surface of
important—to say nothing of compelling or immediate. Surely the
need to move lunch lines quickly is a less important governmental
interest than, say, the generalized concerns about drugs and weapons
expressed by the school district in Doe, where the Court was
unwilling to sacrifice Fourth Amendment protections.145 Surely if
parents need to know the location of their children, technology has
given them the ability to do so.146 And surely attendance is not so
onerous or immediate a concern as to warrant the monitoring of
students’ every move. Even more striking, when school
administrators extol the ability to determine who was present during
a fight using RFID, they breathe new life into the fear that function
creep—taking a system designed for safety and attendance and using
it for crime solving—may become the new reality.
Finally, the goal of preventing school tragedies, while admirable,
fails as a legitimate justification for expanded biometric technology
use for an entirely different reason—namely, it is inadequate. As the
Court has noted, the final Fourth Amendment consideration is not
140. Rosica, supra note 31.
141. See Segall & Fink, supra note 32.
142. Swedberg, supra note 52.
143. See, e.g., id. (“The use of RFID, cameras with built-in analytic software, and a new
phone system—as well as the posting of armed officers and a new director of security—is
intended to prevent tragedies like the December 2012 shooting in Newtown, Ct.”).
144. This explanation is inadequate for other reasons. See infra notes 147–52 and
accompanying text.
145. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 355–56 (8th Cir. 2004).
146. See, e.g., Lori Grisham, Teen Tracking Apps: Good Parenting or Risky?, USA
TODAY (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/personal/2014/09/17/teensparents-tracking-apps-security-mamabear-teensafe/15716335/ [http://perma.cc/8SHF-SU55]
(noting that one parental tracking app has at least 500,000 users).
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only the “nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at
issue”147 but also the efficacy of the means employed for dealing with
it.148 There can be no doubt that preventing school tragedies is an
immediate government concern, but the connection between the
concern and the proposed remedy is tenuous at best.149 Setting aside
school shootings that were perpetrated by non-students150 and those
that were committed by teachers,151 the protections afforded by
biometric tracking on this front are insufficiently effective to justify
the invasion of privacy. Schools have other means to protect students
during a shooting that do not threaten constitutional rights. For
example, schools can equip their doors to lock down in the event of
an emergency,152 and teachers and administrators can carry access
cards. Absent demonstrable evidence that biometric and RFID
tracking would prevent or limit school tragedies, the routine
invocation of recent tragedies is a base appeal to every parent’s
greatest fear—but it is not a constitutionally sufficient justification.
When considering the entirety of the proffered explanations
regarding the need for biometric scanning and RFID tracking, the
school’s concerns and the efficacy of these measures in dealing with
them leave much to be desired.
D. The Final Balancing Act
In the end, what this analysis is left with may be, as Justice Scalia
once put it, the question of “whether a particular line is longer than a

147. As the previous paragraph notes, many of the concerns used to justify the
implementation of biometric and RFID tracking systems are neither compelling nor
immediate. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
148. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995).
149. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS, RESEARCH ON SCHOOL SECURITY:
THE IMPACT OF SECURITY MEASURES ON STUDENTS 1 (2013), http://www.nasponline.org
/assets/documents/Research%20and%20Policy/Advocacy%20Resources/schoolsecurity.pdf
[http://perma.cc/88W5-ZVUE].
150. See, e.g., Pete Williams, Authorities ID Gunman Who Killed 27 in Elementary
Massacre, NBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/14
/15911025-authorities-id-gunman-who-killed-27-in-elementary-school-massacre?lite
[http://perma.cc/R8VP-P74P].
151. See, e.g., Jim Schoettler, Episcopal School Head Dale Regan Killed by Fired Teacher,
Who Then Kills Himself, FLA. TIMES UNION (Mar. 6, 2012), http://jacksonville.com/news
/crime/2012-03-06/story/episcopal-school-head-dale-regan-killed-fired-teacher-who-then-kills
[http://perma.cc/3MRU-YBHT].
152. See, e.g., Emergency Automatic Gun Shot Lockdown System, SECURITY USA,
http://securityusa.net/easl.html [http://perma.cc/G4LM-LFHV] (“The Emergency Automatic
School Lockdown System, or EASL, is a system that has an automated capability to
simultaneously lock down any and all doors in a school upon detection of a gunshot . . . .”).
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particular rock is heavy.”153 On the one hand there is the student’s
reasonable expectation of privacy not to be fingerprinted, palm
printed, scanned, and tracked while going about governmentmandated business. While the standard for children in schools is
admittedly lower, there can be little doubt that the ordinary
American adult would find this intrusion to be unreasonable. This,
coupled with the clear message to American schoolchildren that such
surveillance is not only commonplace but also constitutional, and the
potential for governmental function creep,154 leaves a hurdle for the
government to clear in demonstrating a legitimate need—even inside
the reduced constitutional confines of the public school system.
On the other hand rests the school’s need to safely educate and
feed the children entrusted to its care, the administrative ease
biometric systems promise, the effective discipline they deliver, and
the ever-present and well-founded fear that tragedy might befall the
school. Even with the scales tipped in favor of the schools, the
question of how the courts will measure these two competing interests
remains an open one. While awaiting that clarity, however, the
balancing act described in this Recent Development should allow
legislatures to evaluate the tradeoffs inherent in these systems and
decide for themselves whether the tradeoffs are worth it.
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
While the first portion of this Recent Development has grappled
with the tougher—and perhaps unknowable—question of how the
Supreme Court would balance the competing interests under a Fourth
Amendment challenge to biometric and RFID tracking in schools, the
remainder will focus on the simpler question of what can be done
while awaiting that answer. Perhaps not surprisingly, many states
have decided that the tradeoff—at least in its current form—is not
worth it. In 2014 alone, thirty-six different states considered 110
separate pieces of legislation confronting “the collection and security
of student data.”155 Of those bills, at least thirty-nine—including

153. Bendiz Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
154. Not to mention theft, which this Recent Development has largely sidestepped. See
supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
155. See Stinson, supra note 10; State Student Data Privacy Legislation: What Happened in
2014, and What Is Next?, DATA QUALITY CAMPAIGN (Aug. 2014), http://dataqualitycampaign
.org/files/DQC%20Data%20Privacy%20whats%20next%20Sept22.pdf [http://perma.cc
/KKU3-EUN4].
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fourteen that eventually became law—addressed biometric data.156
This Part provides an overview of the current legislative landscape
and presents recommendations for other states to consider moving
forward.
A. Current Legislation
Among the growing number of state legislatures concerned
about the issue, Florida recently became the first state to implement a
ban on the collection of its students’ biometric data.157 The legislation
prohibits schools and districts from collecting, obtaining, or retaining
any biometric information—specifically fingerprints, hand scans, and
retina or iris scans.158 Florida is not alone in considering a blanket
prohibition on the collection of this information. Indeed, legislation
that recently passed the New Hampshire General Court bars the state
from collecting biometric information—as well as twenty-one other
categories of information—from students for any reason.159 The
Maryland Senate has also proposed legislation to ban the collection of
students’ biometric information.160 The bill unanimously passed the
Maryland Senate161 before receiving an unfavorable report from a
House committee162 after the school district at issue voluntarily
stopped collecting biometric information.163
Several other states have proposed or enacted legislation that
would require notice and consent prior to the collection of any
biometric information. Among these states, Illinois,164 Louisiana,165
156. See Stinson, supra note 10; 2014 Student Data Privacy Bills, DATA QUALITY
CAMPAIGN (Aug. 27, 2014), http://dataqualitycampaign.org/files/Privacy%20Legislation
_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/5GRD-KLDA].
157. Act of May 12, 2014, ch. 2014-41, § 2, 2014 Fla. Sess. Laws 798, 799 (West, codified
at FLA. STAT. § 1002.222 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. & Spec. A Sess.)).
158. Id.
159. Act. of May 27, 2014, ch. 68, § 189.68(I), 2014 N.H. Laws 71, 73 (codified at N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.68(I) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)).
160. S.B. 855, 2013 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013).
161. See GAM—Senate Vote Record 0648—2013 Regular Session, GEN. ASSEMBLY
MD., http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?pid=flrvotepage&tab=subject3
&id=SB0855,s-0648&stab=02&ys=2013rs [http://perma.cc/HB64-BQLK].
162. See Md. H. Ways & Means Comm., 2013 Session, Voting Record: On the Motion
to Substitute Bill for Unfavorable Report to S. 855 (Apr. 5, 2013), http://mgaleg.maryland
.gov/2013RS/votes_comm/sb0855_w&m.pdf [http://perma.cc/MM9L-T7A5].
163. See Adam Vrankulj, Senate Bill Could Ban Biometric Data Collection from School
Children in Maryland, BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.biometricupdate
.com/201303/senate-bill-could-ban-biometric-data-collection-from-school-children-inmaryland [http://perma.cc/FCH6-97N7].
164. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-18.34(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.) (applying to cities of over 500,000 inhabitants).
165. LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.8(B)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
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and Arizona166 all require a parent or guardian to provide written
permission—with Arizona requiring permission thirty days in
advance—before any biometric data can be collected. Legislation
currently pending or proposed in New York167 and Wisconsin168
contains permission requirements as well.
Additionally, state legislatures across the country have recently
set their sights on the use of RFID technology to track students.
At the same time New Hampshire banned the collection of
biometric information,169 state lawmakers also largely banned the
use of RFID tracking in schools.170 Missouri lawmakers felt so
strongly about the issue that they overrode a veto effort by the
state’s governor in enacting their own ban.171 These legislative
moves follow on the heels of a complete ban of the use of RFID
tracking in Rhode Island schools172 (also enacted over the
governor’s veto)173 and the enactment of a notification and optout requirement in Oregon.174
B.

Recommendations

As technology evolves, state legislatures have a responsibility to
remain abreast of these developments and implement protections
166. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-109 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. & First
Spec. Sess.).
167. S.B. 3119, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
168. H.B. 616, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014).
169. Act of May 27, 2014, ch. 68, § 189.68(I), 2014 N.H. Laws 71, 73 (codified at N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.68(I) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)).
170. Act of May 27, 2014, ch. 68, § 189.68(II), 2014 N.H. Laws 71, 73 (codified at N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.68(II) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)). (“No school shall
require a student to use an identification device that uses radio frequency identification, or
similar technology, to identify the student, transmit information regarding the student, or
monitor or track the student without approval of the school board, after a public hearing,
and without the written consent of a parent of legal guardian of an affected student which
may be withheld without consequence.”).
171. Act of Sept. 10, 2014, 2014 Mo. Legis. Serv. 137, 137 (West) (codified at MO. REV.
STAT. § 167.168 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Mo. Gen. Assemb. 2nd Reg. Sess.)); see also
Missouri Bans Tracking RFID in Schools, AGAINST RFID IN SCHOOLS (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://rfidinschools.com/2014/09/15/missouri-bans-tracking-rfid-in-schools/ [http://perma.cc
/C6ZL-9YG2] (“The bill will take effect in October after lawmakers overrode Gov. Jay
Nixon’s veto of the bill this past week, just barely getting the required two-thirds majority in
both chambers.”).
172. Act of Jan. 5, 2010, ch. 153, § 42-153-1, 2009 R.I. Pub. Laws 1696, 1696 (codified as
amended at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-153-1 (LEXIS through 2015 Sess.)).
173. The reasons given for vetoing the legislation stemmed largely from concerns over
school shootings and RFID’s ability to prevent such tragedies as well as “the potential
value of RFID for students with special needs.” Swedberg, supra note 12.
174. Act of June 18, 2013, ch. 427(1), § 1, 2013 Or. Laws 1182, 1182 (codified at OR.
REV. STAT. § 339.890) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)).
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commensurate with the challenges they present. To that end, this
Recent Development recommends the following policy changes to
protect student privacy rights: (1) student and parent notification and
permission prior to beginning any collection or tracking; (2) the
discontinuation of any collection or use of data and the destruction of
any previously recorded information upon a student’s withdrawal
from the school or district; and (3) a prohibition on the use or
disclosure of any information obtained for these programs beyond
what is expressly provided for in the initial notification. Each of these
proposals is discussed in turn and, using Illinois’s student privacy
statute as a model, language is suggested for each of the proposals
under consideration.
At a bare minimum, states should require that schools provide
parents and students with adequate notification about these data
collection programs and grant an opportunity to opt out of them if
they choose. In this regard, recent Oregon legislation serves as an
exemplar; it requires the Oregon Board of Education to develop
regulations that, at a minimum, “[r]equire notification to students and
parents about the use of radio frequency identification devices” and
“[a]llow a student or a parent of a student to choose not to have the
student wear, carry or use an item with a radio frequency
identification device.”175 Although the Oregon legislation targets only
the use of RFID devices, the language could easily be expanded to
include biometric data collection as well.
While allowing students and parents to opt out of these programs
is the bare minimum that this Recent Development recommends, the
preferable option would be to require parents to opt in—essentially
requiring an affirmative act prior to enrolling a student in these
programs. On this front, legislation in Illinois serves as an effective
model by requiring “[w]ritten permission from the individual who has
legal custody of the student . . . or from the student if he or she has
reached the age of 18.”176 The distinction between allowing a student
to opt out of these programs and requiring them to opt in may seem
insignificant, but the importance of the privacy interests at stake
suggests that the burden should be on the school rather than the
student.
Second, in order to prevent the continued collection of biometric
information and to limit the possibility of function creep, state

175. Id.
176. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-18.34(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.).
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legislatures should require all schools to discontinue the use of a
student’s biometric information as soon as that student leaves the
school. Again, Illinois provides an excellent model for this potential
legislation because the state’s statute provides for the
“discontinuation of use of a student’s biometric information . . . upon
the student’s graduation or withdrawal from the school district.”177
New legislation should also require school districts to destroy any
previously recorded biometric or RFID tracking information as soon
as the student leaves the school or school district. Not only will this
reduce the potential for, and damage caused by, identity theft178 but it
will also limit the ability of the information to be used outside of its
original purpose.179 Illinois’s statute, which requires “[t]he destruction
of all of a student’s biometric information within 30 days after the use
of the biometric information is discontinued,”180 strikes the
appropriate balance in ensuring that no student data are maintained
beyond its useful life while still allowing a school adequate time to
comply with the requirement.
Finally, legislation should be enacted to explicitly limit the scope
of the use of this information to the purposes for which it was
originally intended. Illinois has enacted a statutory provision that
minimizes—although does not eliminate—the potential for function
creep that threatens to expand the use of students’ biometric
information beyond its intended purposes by providing for a
“prohibition on the sale, lease, or other disclosure of biometric
information to . . . another person or entity, unless the disclosure is
required by a court order.”181 While this provision does not preclude
the possibility that biometric information could be used by police or
other government agencies to identify a student in a one-to-many
matching situation, it does require that a court at least consider the
constitutional issues and would add clarity to the Fourth Amendment
considerations by formalizing the “search” as it relates to the student.
In concluding these recommendations, it is important to
recognize one limitation of the model language above and to discuss
177. 5/34-18.34(b)(2).
178. This will limit the amount of information that could be garnered from any single
theft.
179. This will prevent the development of Justice Scalia’s much-feared “genetic
panopticon.” Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Perhaps the construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt that the
proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open their
mouths for royal inspection.”).
180. 5/34-18.34(b)(3) (2009).
181. 5/34-18.34(b)(5) (2009).
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one proposal not adopted by this Recent Development. The examples
discussed above are limited by the fact that none of the available
legislation comprehensively addresses both the collection of biometric
information and the use of RFID tracking technology. Any
comprehensive piece of student privacy legislation must address both
of these concerns. Whether a court will view RFID tracking as
biometric data collection remains an open question and the issue is
far too serious to be left susceptible to statutory interpretation.
Secondly, this Recent Development does not advocate for a blanket
prohibition on the use of biometrics and RFID in schools. The
advances identified by school leaders and other proponents of
biometric data deserve the praise they receive for streamlining
administrative processes and helping schools focus on the task of
educating the youth. Moreover, requiring students to give their
permission serves the valuable purpose of informing students of their
constitutional rights.
State legislatures—and perhaps in their absence, local school
boards—have a number of avenues available to better protect their
students. Some states have not even scratched the surface of this issue
while others have perhaps gone too far. Among the states that have
addressed the issue with a reasoned approach, Illinois has taken many
of the important first steps and could serve as an effective guide.
However, the failure to consider these issues comprehensively
threatens to undermine the protections that they have afforded to
students and risks confronting new issues as technology continues to
develop.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most that can be said for certain is that the issue of
technology in our schools is not likely to fade in the near future. With
each technological advancement, courts and legislators will face the
unenviable task of discerning new boundaries for old protections.
While the collection of biometric data and the use of RFID tracking
likely constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, the
legitimate privacy expectations of students, the nature of the
intrusion, and the needs of the school will remain as malleable and
ever-changing as the technology itself. Reasonable courts can—and
likely will—disagree about the appropriate bounds of the school’s
authority over the students charged to its care.
In the meantime, the duty rests on the legislature to give this
issue the consideration it rightly deserves. This is not a time for
inflammatory rhetoric and technophobic reactions. But neither is it
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the time for passivity—for “silent approaches and slight deviations
from legal modes of procedure” that would allow “illegitimate and
unconstitutional practices [to] get their first footing.”182 If this
deviation is to be accepted and legitimized, it should be done in the
open and with informed debate. If it is not, then it is too important to
leave unaddressed.
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